

Common Criteria Certification Report

Xerox® VersaLink™ C415 / B415 / C625 / B625
with HDD



CAN-687-LSS

27 March 2026

v1.0



Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Canadian Centre
for Cyber Security

Centre de la sécurité des
télécommunications Canada
Centre canadien
pour la cybersécurité

Canada

Foreword

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE).

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE). This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

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Overview

The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for evaluating the security of IT products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target (ST). A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the ST, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and ST are posted to the [Common Criteria portal](#) (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).

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Executive Summary CAN-687-LSS

Xerox® VersaLink™ C415 / B415 / C625 / B625 with HDD (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from **Xerox Corporation**, was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the following conformance claim:

collaborative Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0E

Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 27 March 2026 and was conducted in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to consider the comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the [Certified Products list](#) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the [Common Criteria portal](#) (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).



Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

Table 1: TOE Identification

TOE Name and Version	Xerox® VersaLink™ C415 / B415 / C625 / B625 with HDD
Developer	Xerox Corporation

See the [Evaluated Configuration](#) section for more details on the evaluated configuration of the TOE.

Common Criteria Conformance

The evaluation was conducted using the following methodology:

Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.

The TOE claims the following conformance:

collaborative Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0E

TOE Description

The TOE is a hardcopy device that copies and prints with scan and fax capabilities, commonly known as Multi-Function Device (MFD), Multi-Function Printer (MFP) or simply printer. The TOE is deployed within office environments for general copy/print/scan/fax use by non-administrative users.

TOE Architecture

A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:




Figure 1: TOE Architecture

Security Policy

The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:

- Security Audit
- User Data Protection
- Security Management
- TOE Access
- Cryptographic Support
- Identification and Authentication
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted Paths/Channels

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the [Security Target](#).

Cryptographic Functionality

The TOE makes use of the following [CAVP validated cryptographic implementations](#):

Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)

Cryptographic Implementation	Certificate Number
Mocana Cryptographic Library, v 7.0.0f_u1	A4653, A4655
Mocana Cryptographic Library, v 7.0.0f	A845

Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

Usage and Environmental Assumptions

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
- The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
- TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according to site security policies.
- Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site security policies.

Clarification of Scope

For the TOE to be in the evaluated configuration the following functions must not be enabled/used:

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reprint from Saved Job • SMart eSolutions • Custom Services (Extensible Interface Platform or EIP) • Network Accounting and Auxiliary Access • Embedded Fax mailboxes • Wi-Fi Direct Printing • Weblet Services • InBox Apps • Remote Control Panel • SFTP when used for scanning • SNMPv3 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scan to USB • Print from USB • SMB Filing • Convenience Authentication • Xerox Workplace Cloud • Proximity Card Authentication • Remote services • AirPrint • Mopria Discovery • IPP
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Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

Table 3: Evaluated Configuration

TOE Software/Firmware	122.029.005.15402 (B415), 122.028.005.15402 (C415), 122.025.005.15402 (B625), 122.024.005.15402 (C625)
TOE Hardware	VersaLink™ B415, VersaLink™ C415, VersaLink™ B625, VersaLink™ C625
Environmental Support	NTP Server, LDAP Server, Log Server, File Server, PIV-CAC card reader, Windows Domain Controller

Documentation

The following documents are available to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

- a) Secure Installation and Operations Guide Xerox® VersaLink® C415/C625/B415/B625 Multifunction Printer v2.4, February 2026
- b) Xerox® VersaLink® B620/C620 Printers and VersaLink® B415/C415/B625/C625 Multifunction Printers System Administrator Guide, v2.1, July 2025 (702P09390)
- c) Xerox® VersaLink® C625 Color Multifunction Printer User Guide, v2.2, July 2025 (702P09381)
- d) Xerox® VersaLink® B625 Multifunction Printer User Guide, v2.2, July 2025 (702P09382)
- e) Xerox® VersaLink® B415 Multifunction Printer User Guide, v2.1, July 2025 (702P09386)
- f) Xerox® VersaLink® C415 Color Multifunction Printer User Guide, v2.2, July 2025 (702P09385)
- g) Smart Card Installation and Configuration Guide for Xerox® AltaLink® / Versalink® Series, v5.0, October 2025 (702P09502)



Evaluation Analysis Activities

The evaluation activities comprised a structured assessment of the TOE. Documentation and processes related to Development, Guidance Documentation, and Life-Cycle Support were reviewed and analyzed.

Development

The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.

Guidance Documents

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators exercised the preparative and operational guidance and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Life-Cycle Support

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.

Testing Activities

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a vulnerability analysis.

Assessment of Developer tests

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

Conduct of Testing

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate proprietary test results document.

Independent Testing

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:

- a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP; and
- b. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluator verified that the claimed cryptographic implementations are present in the TOE.

Independent Testing Results

The testing produced the expected results, supporting the conclusion that the TOE correctly implements the functional requirements specified in the ST and the TOE functional specification.



Vulnerability Analysis

The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases, and technical community sources. Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities. Based upon this review, the evaluators formulated flaw hypotheses, which they used in their vulnerability analysis.

Public domain searches were conducted on **3 March 2026** and included the following search terms:

Xerox VersaLink	Yocto Linux 3.1	Apache
Openldap	Libssh2	Mocana
ARM Cortex A53	Infineon OPTIGA Trusted Platform Module	

Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:

Security Bulletins for Xerox Products https://security.business.xerox.com/en-us/documents/bulletins/	NIST NVD https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
CISA KEV https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog	CVE MITRE https://www.cve.org/
Apache https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html	libssh2 security https://libssh2.org/security.html

Vulnerability Analysis Results

The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.



Results of the Evaluation

The Information Technology product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.

The overall verdict for this evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

Recommendations/Comments

It is recommended that all guidance be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.



Supporting Content

List of Abbreviations

Term	Definition
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL	Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ESV	Entropy Source Validation
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
IT	Information Technology
PP	Protection Profile
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function

References

Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
Xerox® VersaLink™ C415 / B415 / C625 / B625 with HDD Security Target, Version 1.0, March 24, 2026.
Xerox® VersaLink™ C415 / B415 / C625 / B625 with HDD Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, March 27, 2026.
Xerox® VersaLink™ C415 / B415 / C625 / B625 with HDD Assurance Activity Report, Version 1.1, March 27, 2026.